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introduction 
An election protocol is presented that has the following properties: 
0 A voter's privacy can be violated only by cooperation of all other voters. 
0 Voters can ensure that their ballots can be counted. 
Voters wishing to disrupt an election can cause only a M t e d  delay before being 
disenfranchised, unless RSA is broken. 
It is assumed, for simplicity, that a single organization z is empowered to decide who can 
register and that z acts faithfully to complete elections. (T~B assumption is relaxed 
somewhat in the final section.) Nevertheless, even if z were endowed with infinite 
computational power, z could not learn who votes which way or falsely convince voters 
that their votes are counted. 
The remaining sections may be summarized as follows: (1) previous work on voting 
protocols and some related protocols underlying the present proposal are surveyed; (2) 
the ballot issuing protocol and its properties are presented separately, being the heart of 
the present contribution; (3) the model and overall voting protocol are presented based 
on the ballot issuing protocol; (4) some simple ways to apply the techniques to payment 
and credential systems are mentioned; and ( 5 )  the assumptions and several further points 
related to the protocols are discussed. 
1. Relation to Previous Work 
The first multi-party secure election protocol in the literature [Chaum 811 could not 
prevent someone able to break RSA from tracing ballots back to particular voters, 
although some properties about it could be proved under reasonable assumptions [Merritt 
831. A subsequent proposal did not at all protect the confidentiality of ballots from those 
conducting elections [Cohen & Fischer 851. An extension [Cohen 861, similar in nature to 
C.G. Guenther (Ed.): Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '88, LNCS 330, pp. 177-182, 1988. 
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the original [Chaum 811 proposal, divides the “government” into parts, in such a way that 
all parts must cooperate to violate participants’ privacy. Using such a protocol to obtain 
the optimal privacy protection obtained here, however, would allow any single participant 
to disrupt the entire election. Also, it has security against cheating that is only linear in 
the effort required of each participant, in contrast to the.exponentia1 security proved here. 
The present work draws on two previous basic results. One is a “sender 
untraceability” system detailed in [Chaum 88b]. It provides unconditional security 
against tracing the senders of messages and limits the disruption that can be caused by 
participants. The second is the notion of “blind signatures,” which serves as a basis for 
untraceable payments and credentials, as introduced in [Chaum 851 and detailed in 
[Chaum 88c] and [Chaum & Evertse 871. 
2. Ballot Issuing Protocol 
The protocol defined in this section in essence allows an applicant y to gve very 
high certainty to z that the ballot provided byy is of a form that allowsy only to cast a 
single vote. 
Consider the following protocol between an applicant y and organization z :  
(1) Once, and for all applicants, z broadcasts: a small integer security parameter s; a 
second integer parameter n;  an RSA modulus N ;  a prime d > N ;  and n distinct 
random units of the ring of residue classes modulo N (called units modulo N for 
short), denoted v j ,  where j E { 1, ..., n }  throughout. (In ths protocol “random” is 
used to mean uniformly distributed and independent of everythmg else.) 
y- t :  (read ‘) sends to 2”) M=(mi,,), mi,, -vfl ,(;)r& (mod N ) ,  where i E { 1, ..., s}, 
with q random permutations of { 1, ..., n } ,  and with ri,, random units modulo N .  
z-y: C, a random nonempty proper subset of { 1, ..., s}. 
y-z: k ~ { l ,  ..., SI-C; ~ = ( p i , ; ) , p , , , = ~ ~ (  j ) , for i E C ; p i , j = r L 1 ( r l ( j ) j ,  for ~ F C ;  
Q=(qi,j), qi,, Eri,,  (mod N ) ,  for i E C; and qi., ~ r k . ~ ; l ( ~ , ( , ) ) r G *  (mod N ) ,  for i 9 C. 
t verifies that every row of P is a permutation of { 1, ..., n } ;  that mi,; G vp;,, ql,; 
(mod N ) ,  for i E C; and that qf, = mkg,,, mG1 (mod X ) ,  for i $Z C. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
d ( 5 )  
Theorem: For y following the protocol, Tk is statistical@ independent of the messages 
transmitted. 
Pro08 (sketch) Without loss of generality, fix k.  The tuple ( P ,  Q, M j  defines the 
messages transmitted in an instance of the protocol. and A denotes the set of all possible 
such tuples. Similarly, B is the set of all possible tuples (q, ri,,) with l f k ,  1CiGs and 
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1 G j G n .  It follows easily from the protocol that each ITk defines a one-to-one 
correspondence between A and B. Moreover, by the mutual independence and uniformity 
of all the IT; and r,,,, the conditional probability distribution of B given ITk is uniform for 
each instance of the protocol. Therefore the conditional probability distribution of A 
given ?rk is always uniform and hence independent of ITk. 0 
Theorem Assuming y cannot form dth roots of random units modulo N, then when z reveals 
dth roots modulo N of h distinct mk,j, with k j x e d  and 1 <j<n, the probability of allowing y 
to learn dth roots of other than exact4 h of the vi does not exceed 1 / (2s - 2). 
Proof (Sketch) It is sufficient to show that, with probability 2 1 - 1 / (2s - 2), there exists 
exactly one permutation 7~ such that for each j ,  l<j<n.y knows an rj such that 
mkJ = v 4 ) r f .  With probability 2 1 / (2s - 2) there exists at least one permutation d such 
thaty can express each entry M k J  as mk,j ' vnr ( i y ;d  (mod N ) ,  since otherwise only one c 
allows y to succeed. (Notice that for y to successfully cheat, the mi,,'s must be properly 
constructed for each i E C and improperly constructed for each i C. But this implies 
that only one C allowsy to cheat.) It remains to be shown that there cannot be two 
permutations IT' and ?r" such that y knows r'k,, and r"+ with mk,, = vdvy'i , ,  = 
v,qf'jf,,(mod N )  for j E { 1, ..., n } .  If there were two such permutations, theny would 
have been able to learn the dth root of a quotient v ~ u ~ v ; ' z . ~  for some j with d(j)#ta'(j). 
But it is easy to see that the ability to compute roots on random quotients is polynomial 
time reducible to the abilty to compute roots on random units.U 
3. Overall Voting Protocol 
Elections are in three phases: 
first step of the ballot issuing protocol above. This is done only once for the entire 
election. Additionally, z broadcasts an assignment of an outcome to each vi, thus 
partitioning the vi into fixed, disjoint equivalence classes, such that each class corresponds 
with a distinct outcome. For example, assuming the election allows each voter to cast a 
single vote (as is assumed throughout) for at most one of two candidates, then the vj are 
partitioned into two outcome classes, one for each candidate. 
Preliminary: In the preliminary phase, z broadcasts those thlngs mentioned in the 
Registration: During the registration phase, each applicant communicates with z .  If 
z agrees to allow a particular applicant to register, then the applicant and t conduct an 
instance of the ballot issuing protocol of the previous section. The result of this is a tuple 
of n elements, mk,,, one element of which is selected by the applicant. This selected 
element is denoted 61 for the lth registered voter. (It is now assumed that n>>m). The 
final result of the registration phase, which is broadcast by z, is the set of bl, for 1 GI =Zm, 
where m is the number of registered voters. It will stdl be possible for disputes regarding 
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the b’s to be resolved at this point without revealing anything about the votes. 
Voting: The voting phase is begun by z broadcasting the dth roots of all of the bl. 
(Naturally, if this is not carried out properly, everyone wi l l  know.) Then, the I t h  voter 
recovers the dth root on a vi, simply by dividing the dth root of bl by the corresponding 
rh,j. Each voter then broadcasts, under the sender untraceability protocol mentioned 
above, the root of the single v i  recovered. Finally, each voter can venfy that the root of 
the vi sent by that voter was in fact available from the broadcast channel. The number of 
votes for a particular outcome is just the number of distinct dth roots of vi’s 
corresponding to that outcome. 
4. Payments and Credentials 
The election protocol can be used to directly realize untraceable payments: each vi 
stands for, say, one dollar; registration is withdrawal from a bank account; payment is 
made by providing a shop with a dth rood on a vi that has not yet been accepted for 
deposit by the bank. 
mechanism” [Chaum 85 and C h a m  & Evertse 871. The vi serve as unique personal 
identifiers, one selected by each individual. Let di be distinct primes, with dkld and 
(dk,@((N))= 1, for suitably many k’s. Each individual participates in an instance of the 
election protocol with each organization, using a dk unique to that organization. (see 
[Shamir 831 for why such use of the d, is secure.) If not all m votes are cast in any 
organization’s “election,” at least one participant is cheating. In this case, people reveal 
all their rk, ,  and 7rk, and those who are unable to show that their b1 corresponds to a Vj 
that was broadcast are revealed as cheaters and excluded from the protocol. This is 
repeated with different vi until no cheating is detected. 
issues the kth credential to a person by providing the dk th root of the person’s selected 
element, br; then and only then can the dkth root of the person’s selected element with 
any other organization be shown. 
A variation on the election protocol can also be used to implement a “credential 
The remaining unused k‘s each correspond to a type of credential. An organization 
5. Discussion 
It has been assumed that n was large enough to make the possibility of the same Vi 
being chosen accidentally by two voters acceptably small. This might require something 
like n =loom2,  which might be impractical for large m. Another approach allows n =m. 
It is based on the idea that voters will be able to reserve vi’s anonymously. One way to 
do this by is using the “slot reservation” protocol of [Chaum 84a], which has been 
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improved by [den Boer 871. A simple variation allows reservations to be made and 
confbmed one at a time, using any sender untraceability system. (Reducing from 2m to 
m could be accomplished by elections using one dk for each type of vote.) 
If less than m disjoint roots of vi are broadcast, z could form and broadcast extra 
votes. Thus people who register and do not vote, in effect, allow t to steal their vote. 
Someone might entrap z, however, by allowing a vote to be stolen and latter broadcasting 
the real (different) vote, possibly untraceably. 
The essential requirements of the communication channel are that z must not be 
able to provide inconsistent or incomplete messages to different voters, and that voters 
must be able to broadcast the messages required to untraceably submit votes. The lint 
property could be achieved in some cases simply by z making digital signatures on all 
messages including some kind of hash or (even all previous messages) and a time stamp, 
since if inconsistent messages become known, z would be incriminated. 
The requirement that d be prime and > N  ensures that (d ,NN))= 1. To get 
certainty that a small d has this property seem diE6cult in general. It is easy, however, to 
modify the protocol presented to give exponential certainty that (d,+(N))= 1 using the 
idea that y and t can “fip coins by telephone’’ [Blum 821 to develop t mutually trusted 
random units, after which z is required to reveal their dth roots. The probability that t 
can cheat is then t2-‘, assuming that z cannot cheat during the coin tlipping. This can 
be ensured if, for example, z provides the modulus used in coin flipping and is then 
required to reveal its factorization afterwards. 
A natural extension is to divide among several entities various functions of t, such 
as: creating the random vi’s; making the registration (withdrawal) decision; and signing 
the hi's. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Election protocols embodying robustness, verifiability of returns by voters, and 
unconditional security for voters’ privacy have been presented. The techniques also allow 
untraceable payments and credentials. 
182 
References 
Blum, M., “Coin flipping by telephone,” Proceedings of IEEE Compcon, 1982, pp. 
133- 137. 
Boer, B. den, private communication. 
Chaum, D., “Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital 
pseudonyms,” Comm ACM 24, 2 (February 1981), pp. 84-88. 
Chaum, D., “Security without identification: transaction systems to make big 
brother obsolete,” Comm. ACM 28, 10 (October 1985), pp. 1030-1044. 
Cham, D., Evertse, J.-H., “A secure and privacy-protecting protocol for 
transmitting personal information between organizations,” Advances in Cryprology: 
Proceedings of C R Y P T 0  86, A.M. Odlyzko, Ed., Springer-Verlag, pp. 118-167, 1987. 
Chaum, D., “Blinding for unanticipated signatures,” Advances in Cryptology: 
Proceedings of Ewocrypt 87, D. Chaum and W.L. Price, Eds., Springer-Verlag, pp. 
227-233, 1988a 
C h a w  D., ‘The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and 
recipient untraceability,” Journal of Cryprolog, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 65-75, 1988b. 
Chaum, D., “Privacy protected payments: unconditional payer and / or payee 
untraceability,” to appear in Smart Curd 2000, North-Holland, 1988c. 
Cohen, J. and Fischer, M., “A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure 
election scheme,” Proceedings 26th FOCS, 1985, pp. 372-382. 
Cohen, J.D., “Improving Privacy in Cryptograhpic Elections,” Yale University 
Computer Science Department Technical Report YALEU / DCS / TR-454, 
February 1986. 
Merritt, M., Gyptographic Protocols, Ph.D. Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 
GIT-ICS-83 / 06, 1983. 
Shamir, A., “On the generation of cryptographcally strong pseudorandom 
sequences,” ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, Vol. 1 No. 1. pp. 31-44. 
February 1983. 
